Beckwith and Koukl, Clueless Absolutists

Relativism. Feet Firmly Planted in Mid-Air. Francis J. Beckwith and Gregory Koukl. Baker Books, 1998.

As usual in books of this type, the authors caricature their opponents and then attack their nasty, selfish, ignorant victims for the views the authors have ascribed to them. They then ask the reader to join them in their dance of triumph over the dead bodies of enough straw men to light up a good-size fire, the sort of fire to which the medieval Church—not known for its relativism—used to consign heretics.

Instead of dealing with their overheated mischaracterizations, let’s consider the authors’ arguments for moral absolutism. They point out, quite correctly, that the obversation that different cultures and traditions may have different values doesn’t mean that no given culture or tradition can have values that are absolute. But they fail to realize that the observation of cultural difference is not meant to refute absolutism, but to raise a fundamental question: If “absolute” values disagree, how does one establish, on an objective and absolute basis, which ones, if any, really are absolute?

According to the authors, “objective truths … are realities in the external world that we discover … External facts are what they are, regardless of how we feel about them” (p28). In other words, “We don’t invent morality; we discover it like we discover multiplication tables” (p29).

How do we discover the truths of absolute morality? By intuition: “Intuition is a foundational way of knowing that does not depend on following a series of facts or a line of reasoning to a conclusion. Instead, intutional truth is simply known by the process of introspection and immediate awareness” (p56).

“Intuitional truth doesn't require a defense—a justification of the steps that brought one to this knowledge—because this kind of truth does not result from reasoning by steps to a conclusion. It’s a truth that’s obvious upon consideration” (p56).

But what about people who disagree with the authors’ intuitions about what constitutes moral truth? Clearly, one can't reason with such dissidents, because their intuitions are no more subject to the requirements of reasoned defense then are the authors’. Instead, one dismisses them: “They have something wrong with them” (p59).

That’s it. Our intuition is right because we know it is; your intuition is wrong because there’s something wrong with you.

People who find comfort in that sort of approach will enjoy this book.