Beckwith and Koukl, Clueless Absolutists

Relativism. Feet Firmly Planted in Mid-Air. Francis J. Beckwith and Gregory Koukl. Baker Books, 1998.

As usual in books of this type, the authors caricature their opponents and then attack their nasty, selfish, ignorant victims for the views the authors have ascribed to them. They then ask the reader to join them in their dance of triumph over the dead bodies of enough straw men to light up a good-size fire, the sort of fire to which the medieval Church—not known for its relativism—used to consign heretics.

Instead of dealing with their overheated mischaracterizations, let’s consider the authors’ arguments for moral absolutism. They point out, quite correctly, that the obversation that different cultures and traditions may have different values doesn’t mean that no given culture or tradition can have values that are absolute. But they fail to realize that the observation of cultural difference is not meant to refute absolutism, but to raise a fundamental question: If “absolute” values disagree, how does one establish, on an objective and absolute basis, which ones, if any, really are absolute?

According to the authors, “objective truths … are realities in the external world that we discover … External facts are what they are, regardless of how we feel about them” (p28). In other words, “We don’t invent morality; we discover it like we discover multiplication tables” (p29).

How do we discover the truths of absolute morality? By intuition: “Intuition is a foundational way of knowing that does not depend on following a series of facts or a line of reasoning to a conclusion. Instead, intutional truth is simply known by the process of introspection and immediate awareness” (p56).

“Intuitional truth doesn't require a defense—a justification of the steps that brought one to this knowledge—because this kind of truth does not result from reasoning by steps to a conclusion. It’s a truth that’s obvious upon consideration” (p56).

But what about people who disagree with the authors’ intuitions about what constitutes moral truth? Clearly, one can't reason with such dissidents, because their intuitions are no more subject to the requirements of reasoned defense then are the authors’. Instead, one dismisses them: “They have something wrong with them” (p59).

That’s it. Our intuition is right because we know it is; your intuition is wrong because there’s something wrong with you.

People who find comfort in that sort of approach will enjoy this book.

Playing the Hitler Card. A Losing Strategy for Moral Absolutists

Moral absolutists play the Hitler card in two ways, both of which are supposed to trump moral relativism.

In one version, they claim that moral relativism is responsible at least in part for the Holocaust. But Hitler wasn’t a relativist; he didn't claim “all values are relative, everyone has a right to his or her opinion, and so my motto is ‘live and let live’.” No, according to his absolute system of values, it was self-evident that Jews were the cause of the social problems afflicting the German people, not merely because of what some Jews did, but because of what all Jews are, something that everyone knew objectively. And because the right of self-defense is also an absolute and objective moral value, it was morally correct, absolutely and objectively, to remove that offending race from the Earth. Note, by the way, that the belief that Jews were evil by nature derives from certain aspects of Christian theology, which were put forward by absolutists, not relativists—the latter being subject to the possibility that the absolutist Church might have them set on fire to defend the purity of the absolute faith. In any event, even if the claim by moral absolutists about the Holocaust were true, it would be irrelevant to the question of whether moral relativism is still the valid position.

The second version is that moral relativists have no foundation from which to oppose people like Hitler; after all, on their view, his moral values are of the same value, as it were, as anyone else’s. Yet one can have a value system in which, even while it acknowledges that other people might have different views, genocide is wrong and it is right to oppose it. The relativist does not say that he or she has no right to oppose views that he or she disagrees with. What the relativist can’t say is that he or she has an objective, absolute foundation for his or her views. The absolutist does say this, but there is an abyss of difference between saying that you have an objective, absolute foundation and actually having one. When the absolutist is pressed to provide such a foundation, it turns out to be as subjective and bound by culture and tradition as anything he or she derides; it is simply more confused by self-deception. And once again, even if the absolutist is right about the problems that moral relativists land themselves in, this is irrelevant to the question of whether moral relativism is nonetheless correct.

God helps Marines who help themselves (to murder)

Another Marine escapes a prison sentence (except for time served in custody, reduced in rank and dishonorably discharged).

"We can take him home. God answered our prayers," his grandmother said.

"Prosecutors said the unit had abducted Mr Awad from his house when it could not find a suspected insurgent who lived next door. He was then taken to a ditch and shot in the head at least 10 times. The unit later placed a rifle and shovel by his body to make it seem as if he had been an insurgent planting a roadside bomb." I guess Mr. Awad prayed to the wrong God.

Surging "success" one dead body at a time.

The early reports, before the monthly total was finalized, stated that "only" 73 U.S. military had been killed in July (overlooking, as usual, the other coalition military deaths), and pointed to this as evidence that the "surge" was working. The media headlined this as good news. Well, it turns out that the actual count for July is 80, which is just about the number of deaths in each of the 3 months before the surge (81, 81, 83), and, including the other coalition deaths, puts the figure above the numbers for those 3 months (89 vs. 82, 85, 86). In other words, in spite of the surge (356 deaths in 3 months April-June), the number of miltary deaths is right back where it started. In spite of this, the U.S. military is claiming that the "reduction " in deaths among its forces is a sign that the strategy "is improving security"--improving security?!: "Iraqi government figures released on Wednesday showed a sharp rise in the number of Iraqi civilians killed in July to 1,653 from 1,227 in June. The July figure of civilian deaths was in line with previous months this year after June had seen deaths fall by more than a third." So the conventional "wisdom," abetted by a lazy media that begs to be manipulated, becomes that the surge is working, if not politically, than at least militarily, in spite of the deadly reality that it isn't.