pkoplin

Sunday, August 14, 2005

Moral Absolutes: Dennis Prager

In an extensive series of columns (20 parts so far), Dennis Prager (http://www.townhall.com/columnists/dennisprager/archive.shtml) expounds on the inadequacy of secularist, i.e., relativist moral views and the superiority of his moral values, which he claims are absolute because they rest on the word of God. To those who would ask which God, his answer is, “the God who revealed His moral will in the Old Testament, which Jews and Christians—and no other people—regard as divine revelation” (Part II). Nowhere in this series does Prager explain why we should accept the beliefs of Jews and Christians—and no other people—as objectively true, beyond his claim that following the rules he supports would lead to the best of all possible worlds (i.e., Prager’s ideal world).

Prager is careful to point out, however, that “One should not confuse Jews or Christians with Judeo-Christian values [sic]. Many Jews and many Christians, including many sincerely religious ones, take certain positions that are contrary to Judeo-Christian values,” which Prager defines as “Old Testament values as mediated by Christians, especially American Christians” (Part XVIII). Actually, what he means is, “as mediated by Dennis Prager.” Again, he offers no objective standards by which he knows that these many sincerely religious souls are misguided and he has the truly absolute values.

Prager asserts that “the Ten Commandments … is a fixed set of God-given moral laws and principles. … The Ten Commandments represents objective, i.e., God-based morality” (Part XI). So in fact we do know what makes a moral law objective: It’s based on God’s word as found and interpreted by Dennis Prager. He doesn’t say how he knows the Ten Commandments are God-based, other than the fact that they claim to be.

Prager deals with the ambiguity in, for example, “Thou shalt not kill” by distinguishing between moral absolutes (“if an act is good or bad, it is good or bad for everyone in the identical situation”) and situational ethics (“allowing situations to determine what is right and wrong,” which he claims does not negate moral absolutes): “An act that is wrong is wrong for everyone in the same situation, but almost no act is wrong in every situation. Sexual intercourse in marriage is sacred; when violently coerced, it is rape. Truth telling is usually right, but if, during World War II, Nazis asked you where a Jewish family was hiding, telling them the truth would have been evil.”

Thus, “it is the situation that determines when killing is wrong… Murder is immoral killing, and it is the situation that determines when killing is immoral and therefore murder… [T]here is moral killing (self-defense, defending other innocents, taking the life of a murderer) and immoral killing (intentional murder of an innocent individual, wars of aggression, terrorism, etc.).” How does Prager know objectively, based on his reading of this commandment, what type of killing is moral and what type is immoral? (My original essay considers these and similar issues more thoroughly). Moreover, if the cost of making a commandment universal is to make it mean different things in different situations, it isn’t universal, regardless of the rhetorical subterfuge one might use in the attempt to disguise the fact.

Prager sums up his attitude toward what makes his moral beliefs objective: “There is good and there is evil independent of personal or societal opinion; and in order to determine what it [sic] is, one must ask, ‘How would God and my God-based text judge this action?’” He doesn’t tell us how to find an answer to this question that doesn’t rely on one’s subjective interpretation of a text one has subjectively decided to accept as God-based. (Calling on a tradition to bail one out here would merely shift and not fundamentally change the dilemma.)

Finally, Prager does notice that religious absolutes don’t always agree: “That different religious people will at times come up with different responses in no way negates the fact that at least they may be pursuing moral truth.” It’s unclear what point Prager is trying to make here with regard to his conviction that his beliefs are absolute and those of believers dissenting from his views are not.

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